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1. Introduction: EU Renewable Energy Policy, Current State and 
Schemes 
1.1 Support for renewables in the European Union 
Low carbon sources – primarily renewables and perhaps nuclear power - are almost invariably 
acknowledged to give more expensive power than power from fossil fuel sources – coal and gas. 
In a competitive electricity market, as is being attempted in the European Union, low carbon 
sources will not be chosen by power plant developers unless they are either insulated from the 
market or provided with some form of subsidy to make them competitive. 
Policy effort in the EU (e.g. the renewable energy Directive (2009/28/EC)) is aimed at 
supporting technologies and new capacity installations and production of renewable energy in 
three areas: (1) electricity or RES-E   i.e. photovoltaics, wind, etc., (2) transport or RES-T i.e. 
biofuels, and (3) heating and cooling or RES-H&C i.e. biomass, solar-/geo-thermal, etc. (Winkel 
et al 2011). Amongst the three, EU renewable electricity sector has seen most state support and 
effective growth in terms of production and installed capacity in 1997-2012. It will thus be the 
main focus of this report. European Union competition law makes ‘state aids’ that distort 
markets illegal so for low-carbon sources to be promoted, there needs to be market mechanisms 
that do not distort markets or exemptions from this legislation. In this report, we look at 
mechanisms that have been used in the European Union to promote low-carbon sources, review 
the guidelines for state aid in the energy sector, and the challenges they pose to the EU 
renewable energy 2020 targets.  
1.2 Evolution of EU RES Support in electricity market 
In September 2001 EU adopted the Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market. The Directive 
provides national indicative targets to guide the member states’ governments with the objective 
of facilitating increased generation and use of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E). It must be noted that prior to the EU Directive Germany and Denmark had 
already had significant success in stimulating renewable investments through use of Feed-In 
Tariffs (FiTs). The EU approach to support schemes for renewable power between 1996 and 
2007 can be divided into three phases (Mez 2007: 2). They were:  
1. 1996-1999 
DG Energy and DG Competition had adopted a neoliberal approach of using competitive market 
‘instruments for organising the future harmonisation of the sector’.  The approach led to 
pressure on member states to give up feed-in tariff schemes and instead introduce neoliberal 
instruments. This approach was met with opposition from other EU institutions and from the 
post-1998 German government. The so-called Red-Green coalition had taken new steps to 
support generation from renewable sources.  
2. 1999-2001 
DG Competition tried to expand the provisions of state aid legislation to make FiTs illegal and 
introduce specific provisions on RES-E into community guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection with clear preference of market instruments (EC (2001) in Lauber 
2007: 18). That attempt was not successful due to the European Court decision in the case of 
PreussenElektra vs. Schleswag. The case concerned the ‘compatibility of the German Feed-In Law 
with the Treaty’ and the element and role of state aid (Lauber 2007: 18). Aid to operating costs 
in the Community is outlawed apart from specific circumstances and a limited time (see Lauber 
2007: 18-9 for details on aid and additional details of the case). In 1999 EC joined in 
PreussenElektra case but failed in Court as FiTs do not involve any state resources (Luber 2007: 
20). This ruling has a significant effect on the future of incentives for RES-E in the Community. 
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3. 2002 – 2007/8 
DG Competition allowed state aid in several countries in 2002 but the scheme showed slow 
growth. By contrast, REFITS (Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Schemes) in countries such as 
Germany were very successful in stimulating new renewable investment. It also became clear 
that the EU’s 2010 RE-E target of getting 12% of gross domestic energy consumption to come 
from renewable sources would not be met. A new energy commissioner appointed in 2004 with 
‘a more pragmatic approach’ (Ibid.) and a rethink of the existing policies followed. 
In March 2007 the Climate and Energy Package targets were set by EU leaders (EC 2014). In 
2008, EC Directive 2009/28/EC introduced ‘mandatory national targets consistent with a 20% 
share of energy from renewable sources including a 10% share of energy from renewable 
sources in transport in Community energy consumption by 2020’ (Ibid.). By 2009, when the 
targets set in the Climate and Energy Package based on the Directive were enacted, 60% of 
newly installed capacity in Europe in 2009, and nearly 20 of annual power production came 
from renewable sources (REN21 2010: 10) however, as the REN21 report shows, much more 
needed to be done on the levels of policy support and investment alike for the new targets to be 
met. 
1.3 Mechanisms for supporting low-carbon power sources 
There have been five separate mechanisms for supporting renewables used in European Union 
countries: Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs), emissions trading, capacity auctions, renewable obligations 
and a Carbon floor price. 
Feed-in Tariffs 
Feed-in tariffs are the mechanism most widely and most successfully used, in terms of capacity 
installed, in the EU. The roots for FiTs go back 35 years to the USA and the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). The intention of PURPA was to be a relatively limited 
piece of legislation aimed at the perceived problem that monopoly utilities were not paying a 
market rate to buy surplus power from co-generators which generate their power for their own 
use and from small independent generators, choking off a potentially useful source of power. 
PURPA required that utilities pay the ‘avoided’ cost of generation to co-generators. In other 
words, they had to pay what it would have cost them to generate the power themselves. In 
states with surplus power, this would have been the marginal generation cost but in states 
where new capacity was needed, the regulators interpreted this as the full cost of generation of 
a new plant, which, at that time, utilities were arguing should be nuclear power. In influential 
states like California and New York, the price of power from new nuclear power plants was then 
very high and regulators set the price to buy power from independent generators 
correspondingly high. 
This led to a flood of new capacity in California, some of it wind-power and some of it 
cogeneration from oil and gas producers. The fixed price meant that developers of new capacity 
did not have to worry about the risk that utilities would reduce the buy-in rates. Whilst it is 
clear the price set was too high, PURPA did show that traditional utilities were not the only 
companies that could generate power competitively and if barriers to entry were lowered, the 
market was often able to provide more capacity and at lower prices than expected. It was also 
the first major demonstration of renewables. 
Feed-in tariffs were first taken up in Europe by Germany and then Denmark from 1990 onwards 
and again led to a significant level of investment in wind power. The original scheme in 
Germany paid renewable generators a percentage (65-90%) of the prevailing retail price 
(including network charges). In 2000, a new law in Germany meant that the renewables in 
Germany received a long-term contract, typically 20 years, and the price was fixed for that 
period. Instead of a flat rate paid to all renewables, different tariffs were payable for different 
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technologies and, for example, power generated using solar photovoltaic received 10 times as 
much a wind farms. 
The main advantage of FiTs is low barriers to entry for new generators. A new generator faces 
no market risk with FiTs. They know they can sell all the power they can produce at a 
predictable price. The challenge for governments implementing FiT schemes is the price must 
be set very sensitively so that it is a realistic but challenging target. If the price is too high that 
would lead to a flood of new capacity and unnecessarily high costs for consumers. If the price is 
too low little new generation would be produced and any industry supplying the technology 
would struggle to survive. It is advisable that existing schemes continue to get the price that 
prevailed when the project was implemented but prices should be on a downward curve for 
new schemes, reflecting technical progress and learning for what are often ‘infant industries’. To 
give continuity to the equipment and installation industries for these technologies, changes in 
the tariff should be in relatively small steps so the demand does not go from ‘feast to famine’. 
Capacity Auctions 
These also have their root in the 1980s in the USA in ‘least cost planning’ (LCP) or ‘integrated 
resource planning’ (IRP). This built on the experience of PURPA that utilities were not the only 
potential power plant owners and based on the assumption that consumers do not want a kWh 
from a particular type of power plant, they want an energy service at the lowest available cost 
subject to environmental and other constraints. Under LCP or IRP, the volume of capacity 
needed was set by the regulatory authorities and bids solicited for that capacity with contracts, 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), being awarded to the lowest bids needed to meet the 
required capacity. The contest could be for specific technologies or could be for all sources, 
including energy efficiency measures. 
Capacity auctions were taken up in Europe in 1990 in the UK. Here, the attempt to privatise the 
nuclear power plants failed partly because the marginal cost of generation was about double the 
expected wholesale market cost. To allow the nuclear power plants to continue to operate, a 
consumer subsidy raising about £1bn per year was introduced – about 10 per cent of all bills 
was hypothecated to pay for the losses of the nuclear sector. The subsidy, the Fossil Fuel Levy 
(FFL), was complemented by the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which required electricity 
retailers to buy all the output from the plants. The subsidy was in place from 1990-96 and a 
small proportion of it was spent on four capacity auctions for renewables, the first in 1991 and 
the last 1998. 
Capacity auctions are, in principle, more competitive than FiTs because the price paid is set by 
the market rather than by a central authority. In UK, the impact of this competitive pressure was 
impressive with the last auction producing winning bids for on-shore wind of about a third of 
that in the first auction and at a price not much higher than gas-fired generation. However, the 
problem was that less than about 20 per cent of the winning bids were actually built because of 
planning permission problems and because the relatively short contracts made finance difficult. 
Capacity auctions have not been used in UK since then and not on any significant scale in other 
countries in Europe, but it is expected that the new arrangements in UK, being implemented in 
2015, will involve capacity auctions. 
Renewable Obligations  
Renewable Obligations (ROs) replaced the NFFO auctions in the UK in 2002 but will be phased 
out in 2017. Under ROs electricity retailers are required to source a given and annually 
increasing percentage of their power needs from renewable sources. It is for them to decide 
how to do this and the incentive on them should be to meet the obligation at the lowest cost to 
ensure their competitiveness. The required percentage in 2009/10 was about 10 per cent, 
which was largely achieved, but in 2014/15, it was about 24 per cent which will not be met. The 
failure of the RO has been acknowledged for some time and its replacement expected since the 
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Electricity Market Reform process was started in 2012. The problems were mainly that it was 
often seen as cheaper to pay the fines than to meet the target and because the fines were 
recycled from the companies that did not meet the targets to those that did, failure to meet the 
target resulted in no serious penalty. The six large UK energy companies that dominate 
electricity retail were able to control which generation companies entered the market and had 
an incentive to build their own facilities potentially freezing out efficient new entrants. No other 
European country is expecting to implement ROs, so this option is not considered further. 
Emissions trading 
This option also originates in the USA in the 1980s when it was used with some success to 
reduce emissions of acid gases, especially sulphur and nitrogen oxides (‘SOX’ and ‘NOX’). This 
could be achieved by either fitting to new plants or retrofitting to existing plants proven 
abatement technologies, such as flue gas desulphurisation for SOX and selective catalytic 
reduction for NOX, or by choosing technologies that do not emit these gases, such as nuclear or 
some renewables, although abatement technologies dominated. 
A major difference for trading in CO2 permits is that there are no proven abatement 
technologies. The one option, Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS), has not been demonstrated on a 
commercial scale and given the lack of progress and increasing lack of interest by utilities in the 
past decade, there must be doubts whether it will be a technically or economically feasible 
option on the time-scale needed to combat climate change. 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) is a so-called ‘cap and trade’ 
mechanism and was introduced in 2005. Under the EUETS, there was a limited and diminishing 
stock of emissions permits, which effectively set a reducing ‘cap’ on the amount of CO2 that 
could be emitted. Companies that wanted to burn fossil fuels had to acquire (‘trade’) emissions 
permit for the quantity of CO2 they would produce. The size of the permit stock would reduce 
over time to ensure more stringent emissions targets were met. In theory, the price of permits 
should have moved towards a level that would represent the additional cost of not emitting the 
CO2, in other words, the difference in price between, say, renewables or energy efficiency 
measures and burning fossil fuels. 
In practice, there appear to have been serious design flaws, for example, the existing utilities 
were simply given permits and the utilities appear to have used these permits to make windfall 
profits rather than achieve the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 2005, the permit 
price was about €15 per tonne of CO2 but the price has tended to fall since then to about 
€4/tonne in 2014. To put these figures in perspective, the UK government estimated that if the 
construction cost of a nuclear power plant (of the French 1600MW EPR design) was about 
€2.4bn, it would be competitive with gas generation with a Carbon price of €36/tonne. In 2013, 
the UK government announced agreement with EDF to build two EPRs at a cost of €9.6bn each 
i.e. 4 times higher than the estimate figure. If nuclear is one of the cheapest low-carbon 
generation options, it is clear that the carbon price is more than an order of magnitude too low 
to be effective. 
The European Commission has plans to improve the market design so that the EUETS will 
become an effective means of reducing emissions, but outside the Commission, there is little 
expectation that these plans will be successful. 
A Carbon Floor Price 
In the EU, only the UK has seriously considered introducing a ‘floor’ price for carbon. In 2010, 
the British government announced that it would be imposing a floor on the Carbon price 
starting in 2013 with this floor increasing by 2020 to the equivalent in 2010 prices of about 
€36/tonne. The rationale was that those investing in low-carbon generation sources would 
have certainty about the extra costs fossil fuel generators would have to pay to purchase their 
emission permits. 
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In the March 2011 Budget, the government announced the floor price would be introduced in 
2013 at £16/tonne and would reach £30/tonne in 2020, equivalent to about €36/tonne. The 
policy was expected to raise about £1.4bn in its third year. However, the pressure resulting 
from the announcement by the Big 6 of a round of price increases of about 10 per cent led to a 
review of a number of ‘green’ measures including the carbon price floor and the carbon price 
will be capped at £18/tonne, around the level set for 2015/16. It remains to be seen whether 
the EUETS will remain below the floor price and if it does, whether it will be effective in 
stimulating low-carbon generation than in countries without a floor price. 
State aid legislation  
The basic prohibition on the grant of State aid is contained in Article 107(1) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). That article also defines the concept of State aid. It 
provides: 
‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’ 
The European Courts have not yet provided a consistent and comprehensive interpretation of 
the conditions for State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC Treaty). While the 
Court’s definition of aid is often based on the actual wording of the provision, in practice the 
Court has not adhered rigidly to that formulation. In particular, it is by now well established that 
the criterion of ‘granted by a Member State or through State resources’ are not alternative; it is 
necessary to show both that the measure is a ‘State measure’ and that it has been granted 
through State resources. The cumulative result of the Court’s interpretation of Article 107 TFEU, 
therefore, is that in order to fall within that provision a measure must satisfy the following four 
criteria: 
 There must be aid in the sense of a benefit or advantage 
 Which is granted by the State and through State resources 
 Which favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (selectivity), and 
 Which is liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member States 
State aid meeting these four criteria is unlawful and prohibited unless one of the derogations 
contained in Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU applies. Unlawful State aid cannot be granted or, if the 
respective Member State has already granted the aid, must be recovered. Certain State aid 
measures can be justified, and may get clearance from the European Commission in the sense 
that it issues a positive opinion and declares the measure compatible with the internal market. 
Normally all State aid measures have to be notified to the European Commission which must 
decide whether this aid is allowable. National courts may find that there is State aid, and even 
order recovery but the ultimate decision rests with the European Commission. In the field of 
renewable energy two instruments exist that usually allow for support for renewables to get 
clearance by the European Commission: the General Block Exemption Regulation, exempting 
certain types of investment aid even from the notification obligation, and the Guidelines for 
Environmental Aid. 
The guidelines for State aid have been subject to review since 2012 and new guidelines came 
into force on July 1 2014.  These require that the phase-out of feed-in tariffs begin in January 
2016. Small projects, defined as having capacity of up to 3MW, or three generation units for 
wind, and up to 500kW for other renewable sources such as solar or biomass, can continue to 
benefit from any sort of aid including feed-in tariffs until 2020. Existing approved renewables 
support schemes are not covered by the new guidelines. New renewable projects must now be 
supported by market-based mechanisms, such as premia to the market price. The new 
guidelines also require national governments to start switching to a competitive bidding 
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process for granting renewables aid in 2015 and 2016, and to set up tenders for all new support 
grants from 2017. How realistic it is for low-carbon sources to be built under these conditions is 
impossible to tell. However, if the rules do choke off investment in low-carbon sources, this will 
lead to the European Union failing to meet its emissions targets and given that meeting these is 
likely to be a higher priority than enforcing state aid rules, it is likely they rules will have to be 
modified to be more favourable to low carbon generation. 
Table 1  Summary: RES Target, Production and Potential 
  Electricity  Transport  Heating  Total  
D
en
m
ar
k
 
Share of total sector consumption in total final energy 
consumption, % 
20 33 47 100 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2009, % 
27 0 29 19 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2012, %  
38.7 5.8 33.3 26 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand, ktoe 
- Actual (2009) 
- Realisable potential  (2020) 
- Realisable potential  (2030) 
 
 
864 
2,775 
5,881 
 
 
10 
1,128 
1,393 
 
 
2,173 
4,410 
5,826 
 
 
3,047 
8,312 
13,101 
G
er
m
an
y
 
Share of total sector consumption in total final energy 
consumption, % 
22 28 49 100 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2009, % 
16 6 8 9 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2012, %  
23.6 11.1 6.9 12.4 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand, ktoe 
- Actual (2009) 
- Realisable potential  (2020) 
- Realisable potential  (2030) 
 
 
7,869 
21,942 
26,141 
 
 
3,040 
4,313 
4,858 
 
 
8,731 
28,757 
47,832 
 
 
19,640 
55,011 
78,831 
Sp
ai
n
 
Share of total sector consumption in total final energy 
consumption, % 
27 41 32 100 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2009, % 
26 3 13 12 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2012, %  
33.5 0.4 14 14.3 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand, ktoe 
- Actual (2009) 
- Realisable potential  (2020) 
- Realisable potential  (2030) 
 
 
6,325 
20,162 
33,418 
 
 
1,073 
4,089 
5,640 
 
 
3,775 
12,686 
16,832 
 
 
11,173 
36,937 
55,890 
U
K
 
Share of total sector consumption in total final energy 
consumption 2009, % 
23 36 41 100 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2009, % 
7 2 2 3 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand 2012, % 
10.8 2.3 3.7 4.2 
Share of RES in corresponding sectoral gross final 
energy demand, ktoe 
- Actual (2009) 
- Realisable potential  (2020) 
- Realisable potential  (2030) 
 
 
2,168 
18,579 
36,247 
 
 
968 
2,226 
2,889 
 
 
933 
12,992 
20,726 
 
 
4,069 
33,797 
59,861 
Average growth 2009-2020 needed to reach target - - - 15% 
Source: compiled by the authors from EU Tracking Roadmap 20141 and Winkel et al (2011). 
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU) www.psiru.org 
 
Page 10 of 35 
 
1.4 RES-E, RES-T, and RES-H&C 
The targets set in the Directive are known as ’20-20-20’ targets. They identify the three main 
objectives for 2020: 
1. ‘A 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 level 
2. Raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources (RES) 
to 20% 
3. A 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency’ (EC 2007/9) 
The 20% RES energy target is composed of electricity (RES-E), transport (RES-T), and heating 
and cooling (RES-H&C). In each EU member state the proportion of each in the RES 20% is 
different as are both actual and realisable potential growth of RES share in the corresponding 
sectoral gross final energy demand. In Table 1 below we present a summary of production and 
consumption of RES energy in each of the three sectors, and their actual and realisable potential 
growth in the four countries of our focus: Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the UK. 
As is shown in Table 1, in all four cases the majority share in total final energy consumption is 
with transport and heating while the share of RES in the corresponding gross final energy 
consumption in transport and heating is significantly, although to various degree, lower than 
the share of electricity. This means that if the 2020, 2030, and 2050 targets are to be met, 
significant changes in the corresponding sectors are necessary. Existing support schemes and 
their potential for realising the targets are addressed in corresponding sections i.e. RES-E, RES-
H&C, and RES-T, of country chapters.  
Below we present analyses of four EU member states: Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the UK. 
Denmark, Germany and Spain have been relatively successful at meeting their targets, albeit 
with rather different approaches, whilst the UK, which has tended to use more market-based 
mechanisms, is likely to fall far short. It must be stressed that even though significant progress 
has been made on RES-E targets in all four countries, achievements on RES-T and RES-H&C 
components of the targets are meagre.  
2. Denmark  
Denmark is a country with high taxes, low inequality, and extensive welfare state ‘both in terms 
of service provisions and the social safety net’.  Until the global financial crisis of 2007/8, 
‘Denmark was often mentioned in international debates as a model example of a well -
functioning economy, with low unemployment and surpluses in both the public balance and the 
current account balance’ (Laursen et al 2014: 2). It too was and still is a flagship of RES-E 
technologies and their integration into the electricity supply, although most recently those 
mainly involve wind. Denmark’s history of renewables can be traced back to the oil crisis of 
1973. Denmark’s energy import dependence led to it putting extra effort into securing energy 
independence via supporting growth in production and consumption of energy from renewable, 
domestic sources; primarily wind energy. Nuclear power was formally rejected as an energy 
source option in 1985. However, Denmark has become a significant producer of oil and gas from 
its North Sea fields and expects to remain a net exporter of oil and natural gas well into the 
future. The country’s renewables policy is still informed by the need to meet its greenhouse gas 
emission targets. The evolution of the Danish electricity sector since 1973 can be divided into 
two main phases: before and after liberalisation. The latter was introduced by the liberal-
conservative coalition government that has been in charge in various combinations since 2001. 
2.1 Electricity before liberalisation 
Denmark’s leading position in the field of wind power began with the pioneering work of Poul la 
Cour as early as the 1890s. La Cour’s work ‘provided a basis for wind electrification in Denmark 
during the first two decades of the 20th century’ (Meyer 2007: 251). Between 1959 and 1967 the 
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Gedser Mill was producing 200 kW units and in the 1970s became the mother of modern wind 
turbines after introducing their blades on a horizontal axis in an upwind position (Ibid.). In the 
1970s the electricity sector was ‘characterised by a large number of small utilities and a few 
larger ones’ all of which were publicly owned. The system was divided into two parts: the West 
(Jutland and Fynen and some smaller islands) and the East (Zealand, Lolland-Falster, and 
smaller islands) which had no direct grid connection until Sept 2010 when the Great Power Belt 
Link was completed (see later sections).2 Great Power Belt Link (Storebælt) High Voltage Direct 
Current (HVDC) interconnection is a 600MW Line Commutated Converter (LCC) HVDC at a 
highest voltage level of 400 kV (Energienet.dk 2014). The East (Zealand) is synchronised via an 
alternating current (AC) with the Nordic Grid through Sweden, while the West is synchronised 
with the Western European grid (UCTE) through Germany. This meant that the East traded 
routinely with the Nordic countries whilst the West traded with countries like Germany. Some 
of the power stations were the usual ‘condensing’ plants in which the waste heat was 
discharged into the sea and co-generation plants where this heat was used for space-heating 
through local heat grids. Fossil fuel was used in more than 90% of the units until the oil crisis 
(Meyer 2007: 252). Since 1973/4 oil has been replaced with coal but the rest of the system’s 
operations remained the same. In the 1980s Danish energy policy changed as a shift towards a 
‘sustainable energy development’ and ‘reduction for greenhouse gas emissions in an effort 
towards the mitigation of climate change’ (p. 253). Two official plans followed in 1990 and 1996 
to solidify the intentions. The main aims of the plans were to ‘increase the share of wind and 
biomass in electricity production’. The RES target set in the plans was ‘12-14% of primary 
energy by year 2005 and 35% coverage by 2030’ (Ibid). Wind power was given prime 
importance in those long-sighted visionary plans with ‘targets for installed capacity of around 
1,500 MW in 2005 and 5,500 MW (4,000 MW offshore) in 2030, covering 10% and up to 50% of 
Danish electricity consumption respectively dependent on future development of electricity 
demand’ (Ibid.).  
The overall Danish government strategy for wind power promotion between mid-1970s and 
mid-1990s was a combination of:  
1. ‘Long-term government support for research, development and demonstration 
2. National tests and certification of wind turbines 
3. Government sponsored wind energy resource survey (wind atlases) 
4. Subsidies, FiTs and regulations 
5. Local ownership of wind turbines and careful selection of sites’ (Meyer 2007: 254) 
2.2 Electricity after liberalisation  
In June 1999 the Danish Parliament approved a new Energy Act following the EU Directive on 
liberalisation of energy markets adopted in 1996 (see discussion above). The act, in accordance 
with the Public Service Obligation possibilities of the EU Directive, gave priority to RES-E in the 
supply system (Meyer 2007: 261). In 2001 Denmark saw a change of government from a social-
democratic to a more market-oriented liberal-conservative coalition. This led to a drastic 
change in renewable energy policy. Most of the public funding for support and development of 
RES was reduced including funding for many advisory committees, local information offices and, 
in the 2002 budget all ‘R&D programmes, financial support, and agencies for renewable energy, 
except for wind’ were discarded (Photovoltaic Bulletin 2002). After lengthy negotiations with 
the EU and ensuing adjustments, the RES-E priority was removed in the autumn of 2003. The 
1999 Act changed the non-profit principle traditional for Denmark’s energy sector and made 
power plants operate as commercial enterprises (OECD 1999). Such changes presented 
challenges for technologies and systems which were still in the development phase – solar 
collectors, biogas, wave energy, and proto-voltaics (Meyer 2007: 266). Wind power on the other 
hand was in a better position due to (1) being competitive at the current market conditions and 
(2) due to its technological systems development being taken over by the Danish Wind Industry 
that was also gaining access to winder markets (see the next section of this report). An 
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independent Regulatory Committee was established the same year to regulate the profits of grid 
companies. Transmission system operators (TSO) had to be completely independent of 
companies operating in the competitive parts of the electricity sector, generation and retail. The 
Act also introduced a quota on annual CO₂ emissions for utilities starting with 22 million tonnes 
in 2001 and decreasing to 20 million tonnes by 2003 (Meyer 2007: 261). The emissions quota 
was introduced in Denmark to support its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol.3  The quota 
amounted to 655 million tons of CO₂ equivalent by 2008-12 equating to a 21% reduction in 
comparison with the 1990 level (Ibid.). In addition, the Energy Act introduced a shift from the 
FiTs system to a green market for trade in green certificates (RES-E labels) combined with a 
consumer quota for green electricity certified by government. Under the liberal-conservative 
coalition government in 2005, the increase in wind power capacity was slow (Meyer 2007: 
254).   
For the RES systems and technologies that in early 2000s were at their development stage e.g. 
solar collectors, biogas, wave energy, and photo-voltaics, the cuts in state support were 
catastrophic. They were simply not competitive in the energy market especially if ‘externalities 
from fossil fuels are not fully internalised’ (p. 266). So, in 2009, production of photovoltaics, 
geothermal electricity, solar thermal electricity, and wave and tidal power all equalled zero 
(Winkel 2011: 71). Biogas production only grew from 17 ktoe in 1999 to 26 ktoe in 2007 and 27 
ktoe in 2009. The realisable potential by 2020 is estimated to be 162 ktoe, which will be 
unattainable unless the current annual production growth rate of 3% is increased (Ibid.).  
In 2000, just before the 2001 change of government, Denmark became part of the wholesale 
electricity market, NordPool that covers the Nordic region, including Norway, Sweden and 
Finland although the East is still synchronised to UCTE. NordPool’s history dates back to 1991 
when it was created as a result of Norway’s decision to deregulate its electricity market. It was 
subsequently expanded to include Sweden, Finland and finally Denmark. In 1998 Nord Pool ASA 
opened its first office in Denmark.  By 2002 the firm became the Nord Pool Spot - a company 
that was, by 2014 ‘also the world’s largest market of its kind, and provides the leading market 
for buying and selling power in the Nordic and Baltic regions, as well as Germany and Great 
Britain’.4 Within the Nord Pool, Elbas, Nord Pool Spot’s intraday trading system for the physical 
electricity market, was launched in 1999 which was joined by the Eastern Denmark in 2004 and 
Western in 2007. In August 2005 a Danish national power grid operator merger was completed 
which brought together the electricity networks of Eltra, Elkraft System and Elkraft 
Transmission and the natural gas transmission system operator Gastra into one state-owned 
company, Energinet.dk (Enegienet.dk 2013). The company ‘owns the natural gas transmission 
system and the 400 kV, 150 kV and 132 kV electricity transmission system and is the co-owner 
of the electrical interconnections to Norway, Sweden and Germany’ (Ibid.). It is ‘an independent 
public enterprise owned by the Danish state as represented by the Ministry of Climate, Energy 
and Building’ and its revenue comes from tariffs approved by the Danish Energy Regulatory 
Authority (Ibid.). The latest element of grid integration was the construction and bringing into 
operation of the Great Belt Power Link (Storebælt HVDC) in September 2010 that for the first 
time sent wind-power generated electricity from Western Denmark to Eastern Denmark 
(Energienet.dk 2010). Since the liberalisation of the energy market there has been greater grid 
and supply integration and stress on wind power as a RES, onshore and offshore alike. The grid 
integration allows bring the wind power generated offshore into the main grid that previously 
was compartmentalised. 
2.3 RES-E  
The main support principle for RES-E in Denmark is promotion via a price regulation i.e. 
producers receive ‘a variable premium on top of the market price’. In some cases ‘plant 
operators are granted a guaranteed bonus and are thus not subject to a statutory maximum’. In 
addition, a small subsidy is paid by transmission grid operator Energinet.dk to small systems for 
the generation of electricity. The subsidy is an incentive introduced by the Danish government 
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and the Danish Commission on Climate Change strategy to decrease reliance on imported gas 
and increase production of renewable electricity5 
2.4 RES-H&C 
The support mechanism for generation of RES-H is tax exemptions. So, ‘biomass, being CO2 
neutral, is exempt from the CO2 tax’ and ‘solar heating plants are exempt from both energy and 
CO2 taxes’ (Winkel 2011: 73). 
2.5 RES-T 
In January 2010 Danish government obliged oil companies ‘to ensure that in 2012 at least 5.75 
percent of annual sales of fuel for land transport consist of biofuels’. Since January 2005 a CO2 
tax exemption on biofuels has been in place and is still the main supporting measure for 
biofuels. There are also proposals for ‘the restructuring of vehicle taxation so that it is 
transferred from ownership of a vehicle to its use’. The proposal will make it more attractive to 
buy an energy-efficient vehicle, irrespective of technology. If such a restructuring is approved, it 
could probably be implemented after 2017. 
Denmark’s expansion of renewable energy ‘is financed by feed-in-tariffs paid by consumers of 
electricity, but the rising efficiency of renewable energy [according to the government] means, 
that the cost to consumers of 33% renewable energy in 2020 will be lower than the 11 % 
provided in 2002’.6 What is peculiar in Danish case is that according to the government ‘the 
transition is relatively cheap, and business competitiveness not harmed’ – something that is 
often an issue in other EU countries. The government estimated that it will cost approximately 
€10 per household a month at the highest (2020) and that that price will only slowly increase to 
this level. The government consider this ‘a reasonable insurance policy against unexpected 
increases in fossil fuel costs and a solid investment in Denmark’s future energy security’.7  
In February 2014 a cross-party agreement was reached in Parliament for the adoption of the 
Green targets as Law. Denmark’s new climate minister Rasmus Helveg Petersen announced that 
‘the broad agreement on the 40% reduction of greenhouse gasses, to ensure meeting the 
ambitious targets that the government has set, will continue, even after an election’ (in King 
2014). Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt too has backed the new law (Ibid). For the first 
time in the country’s history, a uniform decision across all political spectrum was achieved - the 
Social Democrats, the lead member of the ruling coalition, together with the Conservative 
People’s Party, Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance, all backed the Law. 
Moreover, even Lykke Friis who is a front-bench spokeswoman for the opposition Liberal Party, 
right-of-centre and fiercely pro-business, declared that ‘the decision to ditch fossil fuels is a 
matter of sound financial planning’.8 The Danish Energy Agency (2012) has calculated that in 
2012 renewable electricity production accounted for 43.1% of domestic electricity supply (of 
which 29.8% was wind power). To put it differently, ‘renewables accounted for 25.8% of energy 
consumption in 2012, against 23.1% in 2011’ (King 2014). The Law also established a Climate 
Council that is modelled on the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) and ‘will advise the 
government on the most cost effective ways of reducing the country’s reliance on fossil fuels’ 
(King 2014).  
There is strong promise of fossil fuel dependency decrease in Denmark considering that 
between 1980 and 2010, ‘the share of renewable energy rose from 3 % to 19 %’. If the growth 
remains on the same level,’ the rise will continue to 33 % by 2020’ making a third of Danish 
energy ‘produced by green energy primarily [from] wind and biomass’. The Danish 
government’s vision is that by ‘tying electrical grid into a regional framework and by having a 
spare capacity backed by biomass, Denmark will continue to have a stable energy system’. 9 
Whether this optimistic forecast will materialise remains to be seen. The government 
announced that ‘by the end of this decade, [Denmark] will produce a third of its energy from 
renewable sources - wind power, in particular, but also solar power and the burning of 
"biomass."10 In 2014, 23.40% of energy consumption was renewable, which is the eighth highest 
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indicator among OECD countries. Presently ‘the government has rather ambitious renewable 
energy goals which state that Danish energy production should be fossil free by 2050’ (Laursen 
et al 2014:23). The goals are achievable provided green energy production growth rate does not 
decrease.  
3. Germany 
In 2014, Germany was Europe’s largest national power market and one of the three historically 
biggest producers of environmental technology in the world, alongside US, Japan, and now 
China. It is also a leader in terms of energy produced from renewable sources among large 
industrialised countries.  Overall, there is a strong ‘consensus … that the country’s long-term 
economic competitiveness must be linked to the restructuring of the economy in a resource and 
energy efficient and climate-friendly direction’ (Schreurs 2012: 6-7). That consensus is a social 
foundation of Germany’s energy transition also known as ‘Energiewende’. The term first 
appeared in ‘a 1980 study by Germany’s Institute for Applied Ecology’ and literally means 
‘energy transition’.11 In 1982 a book by the Institute entitled Energiewende: Growth and 
Prosperity Without Oil and Uranium12 was published which laid out the main principles of the 
energy transition to the system without nuclear power or fossil fuels.  In 2004, according to the 
analysis of Seiwert et al. (2007), Germany surpassed the US as the world’s largest exporter of 
environmental technologies (in Schreurs 2012: 7). In terms of the RES support schemes, 
Germany pioneered the use of the FiTs system. The directed public policy of the red-green 
coalition (in office 1998-2005) led to a remarkable expansion in the sector and by 2007 the 
country had the highest installed capacity for wind energy and second after Italy for 
photovoltaics in the EU (Lauber and Mez in Mez 2007: 177).13 In 2007 the policy was aimed at 
achieving more than 50% of electricity generated from RES by 2050. This policy was popular 
with the public but not the established interests in the energy sector (Ibid.). By 2010, 
greenhouse gas emissions were about 23% below 1990 levels (Schreurs 2012: 7).14 At the same 
time the government established ambitious greenhouse gas emissions targets and established 
standards to guide industry and society as well as created some 370,000 new jobs through 
renewable energy industries. The amended Energy Act that came into force on 1 August 2014 
set even more ambitious targets so that ‘the share of the energy generated from renewable 
energy sources increases from 40 to 45 percent until 2025, from 55 to 60 percent until 2035, 
and to 80 percent until 2050’.15 
Total energy demand has seen some drop in the early 1990s but electricity generation has 
steadily increased. In 2008 as a result of the economic crisis a sharp drop in consumption 
occurred. In 2014 ‘total power generation [had] not come back to pre-crisis levels, despite a 
boom of the German economy and increasing power exports ‘ which is likely to be an indicator 
of ‘efficiency gains in the economy’ (Jungjohann and Morris 2014: 6). In 2013, Germany was still 
the leader for wind power in the EU – and 3rd in the world after China and US respectively - 
with 34,250 MW installed capacity.16 In terms of photovoltaics, in 2012 Germany became the 
world leader too ‘with 7.6 GW of newly connected systems; followed by China with an estimated 
5 GW; Italy with 3.4 GW; the USA with 3.3 GW; and Japan with an estimated 2 GW’.17 
3.1 Energiewende  
Nuclear phase out started long before the disaster of Fukushima and is at the core of Germany’s 
Energiewende. The first policy step was taken in the year 2000 with adoption of the Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG) by the German government that announced a nuclear phase-out. Until 2009, 
subsequent governing coalitions stuck to this decision and then ‘the Conservatives (CDU) and 
Liberal Democrats (FDP) came into power, gave in to nuclear lobby pressure, and delayed ‘the 
retention period of nuclear power plants’. When, in 2010, the government presented its goals 
for renewable energies and for the reduction of CO2 emissions, the goal was for Germany to 
become one of the first industrialised countries to base its electricity production, mobility, 
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industries and private households on sustainable and renewable energy. The engine for this 
ambitious programme was the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) (Greenpeace 2014).18 
In 2010, the German government formulated guidelines for an environmentally sound, reliable 
and affordable energy supply in a long term energy strategy that reached to 2050. The strategy 
identified 9 spheres of action to be taken in order to achieve the targets of 80% RES energy in 
the general supply by 2050: 
 Renewable energies as a cornerstone of future energy supply 
 Energy efficiency as the key factor 
 Phase-out of nuclear power and fossil-fuel power plants 
 An efficient grid infrastructure for electricity and integration of renewables 
 Energy upgrades for existing buildings and energy-efficient new buildings  
 The mobility challenge 
 Energy research towards innovation and new technologies 
 Energy supply in the European and international context 
 Acceptance and transparency.19 
A large part of Energiewende implementation is the monitoring process that helped to develop 
the framework as it is being implemented by ‘[identifying] suitable indicators and [stating] the 
necessary data on which to base’ the policy (Löchel et al. 2014: 3).  In 2014 the second 
Monitoring Process report by the Expert Commission on the “Energy of the Future” (data of 
2012 and partly 2013) suggested the government moves onto a ‘more problem-orientated 
approach’ (p.3). Thus a change from the previous report was the decision to ‘monitor to identify 
suitable indicators approach’ and ‘aim more to analyse and evaluate the developments 
observed’ in regards to the issues such as: 
1. The monitoring process as an element of the Energiewende 
2. The phase-out of nuclear energy and development of greenhouse gas emissions 
3. Initiatives in the field of energy efficiency 
4. Development of supply security in the light of potential unreliability of certain energy 
sources e.g. wind 
5. Economic viability of the energy supply 
6. Innovation impetus provided by the Energiewende (Löchel et al. 2014) 
Energiewende is defined by ‘two superordinate targets: lowering greenhouse gas emissions by 
at least 80% by 2050 and phasing out the use of nuclear power by the end of 2022’ (Löchel et al. 
2014: 4). The two in turn are complemented by a number of sub-targets which are implemented 
via political enforcement but are inflexible and need to be made more adjustable without 
compromising the attainment of superordinate targets (Ibid.). Until 2013 German government 
has been only using quantitative target in the Energy Concept as lead indicators which is a 
shortcoming. It needs to be overcome by taking into account ‘non-quantitative aims of security 
of supply, economic viability and environmental soundness – beyond greenhouse gas emissions 
– of the energy supply as well as acceptance and societal impact of the Energiewende’ (Ibid., p. 
4) for a more long-term policy approach, sustainable economically, socially, and 
environmentally. The new proposed framework for the ‘Energy of the Future’ monitoring 
process is based on ten lead indicators for five dimensions of Energiewende. The framework 
includes: greenhouse gas emissions, the phase-out of nuclear power, the share of renewables in 
gross final energy consumption, final energy consumption, System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI) for electricity, the power balance, innovation, National Energy Accounts, 
social impacts on the basis of the “high cost/low income” approach and acceptance’ (Ibid., pp. 4-
5). Figure 1 below is a visual representation of the lead indicators and dimensions.   
Other state stakeholders also take part in these in the discussion on Energiewende with their 
own systems of indicators. Their main suggestion is the use ‘of an aggregate perspective 
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through lead or aggregate indictors based largely on the energy policy triangle of “security of 
supply, economic viability, and environmental soundness”’ with inclusion of dimensions beyond 
the triangle as well (p.5). One positive development is that the presence of many 
complementary initiatives expends the information base. 
Figure 1. Lead indicators for the ‘Energy of the Future’ monitoring process.  
 
 
Source: Löchel et al. (2014: 5). 
 
In June 2011, a new amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) was passed by the 
Bundesrat. It came into force on 1 January 2012 and aimed to make RES more competitive. It 
keeps the existing FiTs in place but adds a market premium ‘that allow producers to sell RES-
electricity on the electricity markets’ (Winkel et al. 2011: 109). The EEG amendment also 
changes the tariff structure of other RES and included biomass, geothermal, and offshore wind 
power. In the case of photovoltaics, a dynamic ‘degression’ of tariffs based on capacity increase 
had been in place since 2010/11 already (Ibid.).  In May 2011 the Act on the Promotion of 
Renewable Energies in the Heat Sector (EEWärmeG) too was amended to implement the 
objectives of the Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources 
(2009/28/EC). It introduced strict ‘norms for heating and cooling in existing public building 
that undergo major renovations’ while allowing private buildings’ standards to be less 
restrictive. In the transport sector, the mandated E5 fuel blend was increased to E10 (10 % 
ethanol) in January 2011 and additional quality criteria for biofuels were introduced by the 
Biofuels Sustainability Ordinance. They allowed biofuels to benefit from tax reductions and to 
be an eligible source to fulfil the blending target (Ibid.). 
3.2 RES Support schemes 
RES-E 
FiTs have been the major support instrument for RES-E in Germany backed by EEG and 
supported by additional fiscal measures that support RES-E installations. Responsibilities for 
monitoring and implementation are divided between the Federal Ministry of Environment 
(BMU) and the Federal Grid Agency.  All qualifying technologies apart from those that involve 
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co-firing in conventional power plants are eligible for FiTs which can be combined with the 
fiscal support (Ibid, p. 109). FiTs are distinguished by ‘technology and size of installation, and 
are subject to annual degression for new installations’. The scheme is financed by final 
consumers and there is no overall cap on the cost. In case of compliance with distinct quality of 
service provision criteria additional bonuses are paid to suppliers.  
‘Feed-in Tariffs have resulted in a more than 25% share of renewable electricity, technological 
innovation, thousands of tonnes of CO2 savings, 370,000 jobs as well as high revenues for 
communities and regions. About 20 million Germans today live in so-called 100% RE regions (in 
total about 140 country-wide) that aim to supply 100% of their electricity and often also heat 
demand with renewables. These regions create local value by saving high costs for energy 
imports, creating local jobs and generating tax income. The FiT law leveraged private 
investment: About 888 energy cooperatives as well as private investors, farmers, banks and 
enterprises own about 95% of total installed RE capacity. The “big four” power providers own 
the other 5%’.20 
RES-H&C 
The primary support for RES-H&C is the RES-H Act (EEWärmeG) that ‘introduces the obligation 
to use RES-H in new buildings larger than 50m2 and includes the Market Incentive Programme 
(MAP)’. The latter provides ‘investment subsidies and grants as well as long-term, low-interest 
loans with a fixed interest rate and redemption-free grace years for RES-H&C installations’ with 
an annual budget of €350 million in 2010 (Winkel 2011: 110). 
RES-T 
The main source of RES-T is biofuels which are supported by a quota obligation (overall set at 
6.25% annually until 2014) as well as by a tax exemption. Second generation fuels (advanced 
biofuels generated from various types of biomass) and ethanol are tax exempt until 2015 but 
exemptions for all other biofuels were phased by 2014. Instead of expected raise of quota 
obligation in 2015, the requirement was replaced with another one: ‘the mineral oil sellers must 
now reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of their products by 3.5% (4% in 2017 and 6% in 
2020)’.21 
In September 2013 the BDI industry federation22 - this represents about 100,000 companies 
including Siemens AG (SIE) and Volkswagen AG (VOW) – announced they wanted to get rid of 
feed-in tariffs that ‘guarantee owners of new clean-energy plants above-market payments for 20 
years under the EEG renewable law’.23 In a 19-page long reform proposal BDI urged for the 
renewable energies to be integrated into the market. They stipulated in the proposal that ‘the 
EEG with its guaranteed feed-in tariffs and priority access for renewables can’t support the 
needs of a power generation market with supply and demand structures’ (Ibid.). Indeed, 
Germany is Europe’s biggest clean-energy market with some of the highest power prices. There 
were multiple pressures on Chancellor Merkel from the VCI chemical lobby, Germany’s biggest 
utility industry groups VKU and BDEW as well as the Free Democratic Party, Merkel’s junior 
coalition partner to phase out or halt feed-in tariffs.  
Future prospects 
Renewable Energy Act Reform 
In early April 2014, the German cabinet approved the Renewable Energy Act Reform that some 
referred to as the Feed-in Tariff 2.0 (FiT 2.0).24 The bill was met with criticism as it was seen as 
failing to address issues that it was aimed to address, such as grid development, market 
integration and financial instruments. Instead, the bill favoured the corporations and energy 
utilities that have failed to integrate renewables into their business model’ (Ibid.). Leidreiter 
(2014) calls the reform ‘a collection of compromises that shields fossil autocracy and large 
energy utilities at the expense of energy consumers, citizen cooperatives and the renewable 
energy sector with its 370,000 employees’.25 
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The new policy is controversial on the following grounds: 
1) Cap for wind and photovoltaic RES 
An attempt to centralise and control the Energiewende - by capping the amount of renewable 
electricity that qualifies for the FITs. It will differ depending on type of technology: on-shore 
wind 2.5 GW per year, photovoltaic 2.5 GW per year, biomass about 1 GW per year and offshore 
wind 6.5 GW to 2020. This does leave a lot of room for manoeuvre for renewables however 
introduces a degree of rigidity into a previously flexible, decentralised and community-driven 
approach. 
2) Exemptions for energy intensive industry  
The main reasons behind the increasing electricity prices in Germany are the exemptions for 
energy intensive industries from the renewable energy surcharge which cost average 
consumers 6.3 euro cents per kWh. 
3) Taxing self-consumption of solar PV 
The reform introduces a FiT surcharge on self-produced electricity consumed by owners of 
solar photovoltaic systems larger than 10 kW (except existing installations). This jeopardises 
existence of specific business models for energy cooperatives and regional energy suppliers that 
emerged as a result of Energiewende by making them less economically viable in two ways. 
Firstly, it increases their costs of production and consumption. And secondly, the reform 
facilitates tougher competition from the energy intensive industries that will only pay 15% of 
the same surcharge regardless of the way the energy is generated. Because fossil fuel energy is 
cheaper, this will create a general pull away from the use of RES.  
4) Direct marketization  
The reform makes marketization i.e. removal of state support/protection and exposure to 
market competition from all other eligible energy suppliers, of RES production mandatory. 
Previously, under the Renewable Energy Act a fixed FiT was ensured for 20 years. That will now 
change.  
‘The reform foresees the mandatory direct marketing first for renewable energy plants with a 
capacity over 500 kW (from August 2014 onwards). From 2016 onward, this will also apply to 
installations over 250 kW and from 2017 installations over 100kW’ (Leidreiter 2014). 
5) Quota system instead of Feed-in Tariffs 
Successful FiTs will be replaced with a tender or quota system by 2017 thus removing the 
purchase obligation for RES that is embedded in FiT. This will make RES producers easy to be 
outcompeted due to their limited economic capacity and lack of bureaucratic 
experience/capacity of/in the tendering process. The auction reform to enter into force in 2017 
was ‘sharply criticised’ by the Bundesrat26  because it will ‘discriminate against smaller players 
that have led the country’s renewable energy revolution’ (Knight 2014: 1). The obligatory 
auction procedure means that ‘onshore wind project developers would have to bid before 
having all permits and preliminary contracts, and would have to price in the risk of not winning’ 
(Ibid.). The objections were dismissed by the government because it was decided that they 
contradict EU State Aid Guidelines.  
Return to coal  
Over the last two years there has been much speculation in the media as to the changing role of 
coal in Germany and elsewhere. Some even spoke about a possible “glowing future” for coal 
power and a “coal comeback” in Germany (Schultz 2012, McCown 2013). Moreover, some 
argued that domestically produced lignite can become a replacement for nuclear power that is 
being phased out at the moment (Birnbaum 2013). The German government appears to be 
paradoxically committed to both Energiewende and construction of coal plant at the same time. 
However, a recent report by Jungjohann and Morris (2014) dispels those speculations. They 
claim that the concerns are ‘based largely on a temporary uptick in coal power in 2012/13 (due 
to a cold winter and greater power exports) and on a round of new coal plants currently going 
online’ (p.4). More importantly, coal is not making a comeback and ‘projects started in 2005-
2007 as part of an overall trend in Europe caused by low carbon prices and upcoming stricter 
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pollution standards for coal plants’ (Ibid). Thus, the coal plant construction is unrelated to the 
post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out that began in 2011. Jungjohann and Morris conclude that by 
initiating a reform of the emissions trading system (EU-ETS) Germany could phase out coal by 
mid-2020s. It is also advised that the country considers ‘taxing carbon and implementing a 
Climate Protection Act, focus more on efficiency, and strengthen natural gas as a bridge fuel’ 
(p.4). However, in the light of the Renewable Energy Act reform discussed above the likelihood 
of coal remaining strong is high.  
Remunicipalisation  
In the light of growing energy prices in Germany there has been growing public discontent of 
energy privatisation and growing support for (re-)municipalisation (EPSU 2011).27 So, between 
2007 and 2011 ‘44 new local public utilities (Stadtwerke) have been set up and more than 100 
private concession contracts for energy distribution networks and service delivery have 
returned to public hands’. In the City of Hamburg, for example, in January 2014 Vattenfall 
agreed to sell its 74.9% share in electricity grid to the city following a referendum on 
remunicipalisation of the distribution grids for electricity, gas, and district heating held in 
September 2013 (Lethbridge and Yurchenko 2014: 17). Vattenfall co-owns the district heating 
network with the city, 74.9% and 25.1% respectively and is offering to sell its shares to the city 
(Lang 2014). There have been cases of energy companies selling entire networks back to the 
government. ‘Almost all existing contracts in the energy sector are up for renewal in the period 
up to 2016’ and 2/3 of communes plan to buy back their energy networks (Ibid.). Whether this 
will materialise or not is not currently known however a full scale remunicipalisation of energy 
networks is unlikely and can be undesirable for the communes due to the potential high costs of 
operating the grids. Presently, ‘high penetrations of renewables with legal priority over fossil 
fuels are driving down wholesale market prices - sometimes causing them to go negative’ and 
decreases the value of coal and natural gas plants (Lacey 2014). Utilities’ profits are further 
jeopardised because their ‘commercial and industrial customers are increasingly trying to 
separate themselves from the grid to avoid government fees levied to pay for renewable energy 
expansion’. In 2014 16% of German companies were ‘energy self-sufficient -- a 50 percent 
increase from just a year ago’ and some 23% percent of businesses claim to plan to ‘become 
energy self-sufficient in the near future’ (Hromadko 2014). Lacey explains the dynamic:  
‘Grid maintenance costs go up and the capital cost of renewable energy moves down, more 
customers will be encouraged to leave the grid. In turn, that pushes grid costs even higher for 
the remainder of customers, who then have even more incentive to become self-sufficient. 
Meanwhile, utilities are stuck with a growing pile of stranded assets’ (2014). 
Thus Vattenfall saw $2.3 billion in losses in 2013 due to this same "fundamental structural 
change” (Lacey 2014) in the electricity market and sold its grid (see the Hamburg case above) 
precisely because it was too expensive to run. Remunicipalisation in such a case can become 
burdensome for the communes unless regulated and financially supported by the government.  
4. Spain 
Spain has been committed to RES promotion, particularly on-shore wind and photovoltaics, 
since the oil price crisis of 1973. The intention was solidified in numerous legislative acts since 
the mid-1990s. In 2004 Spain ranked first in EU in terms of installed wind energy capacity and 
with photovoltaic market on the rise. The two positive RES-E market developments were 
facilitated by favourable climatic conditions but mainly were due to ‘a stable, comprehensive 
and strategic policy framework for the promotion of renewable energy sources’ (Bechberger in 
Mez 2007: 201). Spain had seen the highest increase of primary energy consumption of 
renewables of EU-15 countries in the decade up to 2007. The main contributors to that increase 
were the feed-in tariffs and premia that facilitated the sectoral growth.  
PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (PSIRU) www.psiru.org 
 
Page 20 of 35 
 
Spain was one of those hit hardest in the 2007/8 credit crunch and the ensuing financial crisis. 
At the end of 2008 the government began to cut subsidies across all sectors, including 
renewables. Despite this, in the same year still Spain accounted for half the world's new solar-
power installations in terms of wattage. A series of legislative measures followed aimed at 
marketising the sector and cutting state support.  
On 30 April 2009 the Royal Decree 6/2009 was adopted that aimed at limiting the tariff deficit 
i.e. difference between costs to consumers and electricity supply costs of delivering the service. 
The tariff deficit is the cost incurred by all energy producers. One of the measures aimed at 
reducing the tariff deficit and ‘facilitate grid integration’ of small RES-E producers was an 
introduction of a Registry for new RES installations (apart from solar photovoltaics).28 The 
Registry introduced ‘yearly caps on the amount of new wind and CSP installations’. A year later 
RD 6/2009 was replaced with harsher legislation RD 14/2010 that suspended incentives for 
new RES-E projects. At this point already it was not certain whether the RES targets for 2010 
would be met. For example, the Spanish government expectation that RES-E would contribute 
42% of total electricity demand (MITyC & IDAE in Batlle et al 2011: 1) with decreasing support 
for the sector was unrealistic. In 2011 the state of the renewable energy market in Spain was 
uncertain (Winkel et al 2011: 276). The Law on Sustainable Economy was adopted in March 
2011 that stipulated general conditions to implement sustainability in accordance with EU 
targets.29  
4.1 RES-E 
The key policy instrument in the Law on Sustainable Economy was a special remuneration 
scheme with a choice of a feed-in tariff or a feed-in premium. This scheme ‘covers all major 
renewable technologies (and high efficiency production as cogeneration) and provides support 
for different time periods depending on the technology. Tariffs are differentiated by type of 
technology and size of the project, and indexed to inflation. In addition, the remuneration 
scheme was subject to modification if capacity targets were exceeded (as happened with solar 
PV and wind power). Offshore wind projects are covered by a specific tendering procedure’ 
(Winkel et al 2011: 277). 
4.2 RES-H&C 
Since 2006, the ‘main support instrument for the promotion of renewable energies for heating 
and cooling purposes is based on the implementation of the Technical Building Code’. According 
to the Code ‘any new or renovated building is obliged to integrate a solar thermal energy 
installation’ where requirements depend on:  
1. The climatic zone 
2. The surface area, and  
3. Type and use of the building 
There are many cogeneration units in Spain (particularly CHP-plants fuelled by either biomass 
or biogas) in which cases ‘the heating and cooling facilities are also promoted indirectly via the 
above-mentioned feed-in-scheme’.  
4.3 RES-T 
There are two main tools developed for renewable fuels in Spain: (1) tax exemption 
mechanisms and (2) mandatory targets for biofuels utilization enforced by quota obligation for 
retailers to blend their fuel with a minimum share of biofuels.  
4.4 Royal Decree-law 1/2012 (RDL 1/2012) 
In early 2012 the Spanish cumulative energy deficit stood at €24 billion.30 Special regime 
installations i.e. RES-E generators, are not funded by the State Budget. Instead their cost is 
included in electricity rates for consumers. Government regulation meant that retailers 
including Endesa SA (ELE) and Iberdrola SA (IBE) had ‘to pay above-market prices to renewable 
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power producers’ without allowing the incurred costs to add to customer bills that, according to 
retailers, caused a deficit.31 In fact the government simply no longer had the money to support 
the renewables i.e. reduce the “deficit”. On the 27 January 2012 the Spanish government 
‘suspended financial incentives for new renewable energy projects’ in an attempt to tackle the 
growing tariff deficit.32 The latter meant temporarily suspending ‘procedures to pre-allocate 
payment … and financial incentives for new electricity production plants based on cogeneration, 
renewable energy and waste’. The freeze did not affect ‘facilities which are already operational 
or already pre-registered’ (Ibid.).  The RDL 1/2012 guaranteed the existing ‘economic basis for 
installed wind power and pre-registered farms’ while it froze ‘the incentives to facilities that are 
not registered in the Pre-allocation Register’ (Williamson 2012). Moreover, the Registry itself is 
now suspended and although the RDL 1/2012 states that all suspensions are temporary, it is not 
specified for how long the suspension will last. This added uncertainty into the already 
destabilised sector and a year later the deficit too ‘expanded 46 from the 3.85 billion euros 
registered a year earlier’ according to the National Energy Commission Report of 18 April 2013. 
The photovoltaic market has been affected by retroactive cuts to particular financial incentives 
aimed at encouraging the construction of small-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) projects. The 
Spanish Photovoltaic Union (UNEF) – the industry association for the solar sector - has voiced 
concerns about the government reforms claiming that they will damage the PV sector. The 
revision of subsidies was provoked, among other reasons because renewable technologies had 
‘prove[d] more popular and cheaper to install than originally envisaged’ (Out-law 2012). The 
government also announced that in 2011 33% of its electricity demand came from renewable 
sources. On the other hand, during the same year wind power ‘experienced the slowest growth 
ever recorded in percentage terms with a 5.1% increase in accumulated power to just under 
21.7 GW’. The renewable energy industry stated that in 2011 ‘less than 10% of the wind turbine 
production carried out in Spain’ was utilised domestically; and ‘1050 MW installed in Spain in 
2011 are from orders for wind turbines made in previous years’ (Williamson 2012). 2012 was 
the final year of the Pre-allocation Register according to which ‘a total of 1903 MW of wind 
power is registered and pending commissioning’ (Ibid).  
The result of cuts can be seen in drop of compensation for solar photovoltaic (PV) 
generation that reached €1.96 billion (amounting to an average 0.388 €/kWh) in the first seven 
months of 2013.33 That is a reduction of 5.43% (0.3995 €/kWh) in comparison with the same 
period in the previous year (Ibid). 
The Royal Decree-Law 9/2013, ("RDL 9/2013"), ratified by the Spanish Parliament on 17 July 
2013, approved a package of extraordinary and urgent regulatory measures aimed at fixing the 
tariff deficit problem, which is threatening the financial stability of the Spanish electricity 
system (Ashurst Madrid 2013: 1). The directive cancels renewable generators’ right for a 
premium plus the market price or a fixed regulated tariff. According to RDL 9/2013 a 
‘renewable generator could be entitled to receive a "specific remuneration" on top of the pool 
price in order to compensate for the investment cost and operational costs that cannot be 
funded out of its participation in the electricity market’ (Ashurst Madrid 2013: 1). The ‘specific 
remuneration’ will be based on: (i) the installed capacity of the generation unit; and (ii) the 
operation of the renewable facility. This means: (1) marketization of the RES sector, and (2) 
cancellation of the feed-in tariff option which most PV plants previously enjoyed. The amount of 
the remuneration will be calculated basing on (a) ‘the income generated by such renewable 
assets in the electricity market; (b) operational costs and (c) initial investment of such 
renewable assets’. It also ‘shall not exceed the minimum level to finance costs’ while permit for 
‘reasonable returns’34 to be made by RES producers. It sets new parameters for the new 
economic regime of renewable generators and also states that the regime can be reviewed every 
6 years.  
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4.5 Electricity Industry Law 24/2013 
Public discontent over the government’s withdrawal from renewable energy support is growing 
and can be seen in the growing number of customers choosing to change conventional suppliers 
for small green energy cooperatives35 like Som Energia, Catalonia.36 On 27 Dec 2013 Electricity 
Industry Law 24/2013 (LSE 24/2013) was adopted as a ‘response to the structural reform of 
the electricity industry included in the Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Program 2013 of Spain, approved by the Council of the European Union on July 9, 2013’ 
(Garrigues 2013: 1). It replaced the Law 54/1997 and was based on four main principles:  
1. ‘Recognition of free enterprise when it comes to the conduct of the activities aimed at supplying 
electricity that are regulated in the law: generation, transmission, distribution, energy 
recharging services, retailing and intra-community and international exchanges, as well as the 
technical and economic management of the system. 
2. Consideration of the supply of electricity as a service of general economic interest, previously 
considered as an ‘essential service’ 
3. The access of system participants to grids as one of the cornerstones of the operations of the 
electricity system, essential to guaranteeing supply and effective competition in the market; and 
4. The configuration, as a new feature, of the economic and financial sustainability of the 
electricity system as a guiding principle for the actions of the public authorities and the other 
system participants within the scope of application of the law’ (Garrigues 2013: 1). 
The reform was rather vague and in essence meant a green light to marketisation of the RES-E 
sector and liberalisation of the electricity market. Now RES electricity producers have to 
compete under relaxed rules with all other energy suppliers, including fossil fuel energy 
suppliers. What such changes also mean is a shift in approach to electricity as a commodity 
‘essential’ for all to have, a truly public good that if need be should be subsidized, to now being a 
‘service of general economic interest’ or SGEI37. SGEI are strictly regulated by EC in terms of 
when and how they qualify for State Aid and apply to both private and public suppliers of SGEI. 
For the general public it means having less control over access to green energy and less 
potential for affecting prices on RES or any other energy. The decision whether to marketise 
specific SGEIs de jure lies with the EU member state government. However, governments are 
restricted in their decision power by combination of marketization pressure with austerity 
policies i.e. general crack down on subsidies and move towards increased liberalisation of the 
market. In Spain the electricity market is already liberalised which means that Principle 3 can 
be seen as a direct attack on individual suppliers and solar industry alike.38 Together with RDL-
1/2012, the industry reform can be interpreted as a retroactive tax on solar energy producers of 
every size.39 Worker cooperative electricity suppliers which despite the economic crisis and 
being few are growing in numbers are too under threat.40 Their existence – and renewable 
energy production too – are jeopardised by allowing cheaper conventional energy suppliers to 
have unrestricted access to the grids. These changes in combination with subsidy cuts make 
renewable energy suppliers less if not altogether uncompetitive. The first three principles that 
advocate non-discriminatory liberalised market will inevitably lead to increase in consumer 
electricity costs. Thus it is unclear how the forth principle of ‘economic and financial 
sustainability’ of the electricity system can be achieved when even improved unemployment is 
still at 23.7%,4142 real wages are falling in general and wages of many are subject to a freeze.43 It 
is explained in the Preamble of LSE 24/2013 that sustainability means ‘the ability of the 
electricity system to satisfy all of the system’s costs’. At the same time the system’s revenues 
must meet all its costs and must be kept in balance through necessary adjustments, 
increase/decrease in other cost items or revenues (Garrigues 201: 2). The system’s costs are 
funded out of the amounts paid by consumers with some exceptional cases funded from the 
General State Budget. Article 14.7 of LSE stipulates that the ‘new regime will apply to new 
installations and, only as an exception included in the Eleventh Additional Disposition, to any 
other installations already put in place at any date before the entry into force of the Law of the 
electric sector’.44 The reform replaced the system of FiTs and feed-in premiums with a system of 
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retribution. This meant cancellation of the previously regulated price per MWh and replacement 
with a price calculated on the basis of initial installation investment. In a discriminatory fashion 
all ‘existing Spanish RES installations will be grouped and assigned to a “standard installation” 
based on the criteria listed above regardless of the real costs in which producers have incurred’ 
(Cortesi 2014). The reform will introduce a: 
‘new cutback for renewable energy producers which, for photovoltaic energy, will ratify the 
30% average cut on support schemes put in place by RDL 14/2010 and that will be in force 
until the 14th of July of 2013 (which means until the reform itself enters into force) and thus 
will have very negative in impact on the Spanish RES sector’ (Cortesi 2014). 
In addition, the reform introduces new rules to the ‘regulatory lifespan of the installations’ 
which means that it will have a retroactive effect on RES installations that date back to 2004.   
The threat to renewable energy posed by this law was brought to the attention of the European 
Parliament in Questions on 18 Feb 2014. It was considered as that which through ‘change in the 
tax regime applied to renewables may lead to the closure of existing facilities, and the lack of 
incentives of any type, new taxation (Law 15/2012) and charges (the so-called ‘backup 
charges’) are all serious obstacles to the development of new installations’.45 European 
Parliament decided that because Spain’s ‘renewable energy share was 14.3% in 2012, above the 
interim target for 2011-2012 of 11%’, no action would be taken against them unless they breach 
their 2020 target of 20%.46 Considering the increasing cuts to support schemes for renewables 
and marketization/liberalisation of the sector, in 2020 it may be too late to reverse the 
damaging effect of the currently implemented energy reforms in Spain. 
On 16 June 2014 The Cabinet approved Royal Decree 413/2014 (RD 413/2014) ‘on electricity 
generation by means of renewable, cogeneration, and waste facilities’. The law cuts ‘renewable 
energy subsidies as part of a drive to reduce a 30 billion euro ($41 billion) power tariff deficit, 
built up during years of keeping prices below regulated costs’ (Reuters 2014). According to RD 
413/2014 a ‘renewable generator could be entitled to receive the "specific remuneration" on 
top of the pool price in order to compensate it for the capital and operational costs that cannot 
be funded through its participation in the electricity market’ (Ashurst 2014: 1) Both the 
‘remuneration’ and the ‘operation costs’ are calculated in the same arbitrary and abstract 
manner as the LSE factor are. It also ‘set the rate of return for existing renewable energy 
facilities at 7.4 percent and at 7.5 percent for future operations’ (Reuters 2014).  
This was soon met with criticism from, among other, Holtrop S.L.P. (volunteer lawyers for the 
Platform for a New Energy Model, which represents some 1500 RES producers in Spain) who 
wrote a complaint to European Commission prompting infringement procedures against 
Spanish government 
‘considering that Royal Decree-Law 9/2013, Law 24/2013 and Royal Decree 413/2014 clash 
with the Renewables Directive, the Emissions Directive, free movement of capitals and the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations’ (Holtrop 2014). 
The estimated damages to the renewable energy sector could be catastrophic. According to the 
Spanish National Regulator's report on the Ministerial Order published on 7 April 2014, the 
overall reduction is estimated at €1.7bn (Ashurst 2014). So, ‘the remuneration adjustment is 
split between wind power (€600m), PV power (€400m) and others such as cogeneration and 
waste (€150–200m for each renewable technology)’. Specifically, ‘hydraulic/mini-hydro are 
heavily impacted, while cogeneration and waste suffer a reduction of between 79 to 90 per cent 
in the remuneration for investment (those assets are almost deemed to be amortised in the 
regulator's eyes)’ (Ibid.). 
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5. UK 
Until 2010, the UK electricity regulator (Ofgem) and the British government had expressed no 
doubts that the ‘British Model’ of a competitive electricity market was the best way to provide 
an affordable, reliable but sustainable electricity supply to consumers. However, in February 
2010, the Energy Minister (Ed Miliband) and Ofgem both stated that the market solution was 
not sustainable.  
Ofgem recommended47: ‘far reaching energy market reforms to consumers, industry and 
government.’ It stated: ‘The unprecedented combination of the global financial crisis, tough 
environmental targets, increasing gas import dependency and the closure of ageing power 
stations has combined to cast reasonable doubt over whether the current energy arrangements 
will deliver secure and sustainable energy supplies.’ And ‘there is an increasing consensus that 
leaving the present system of market arrangements and other incentives unchanged is not an 
option.’ 
On the same day, the energy minister, Ed Miliband released a press statement that said:48 
‘However, for the longer term, Britain will need a more interventionist energy policy. The scale 
and upfront nature of the low carbon investment needed is likely to require significant reform 
of our market arrangements to deliver security of supply in the most affordable way.’ He had 
told the Times two days earlier that: ‘one alternative would be a return to "capacity payments" - 
in which power station operators would be paid for the electricity they generate and also for 
capacity made available.’49 
These statements led to the instigation of the Electricity Market Reform programme50 in the 
Energy Ministry that culminated in the Energy Act 201351, passed in December 2013. Like the 
nuclear programme, Electricity Market Reform has not been a party political issue and the 
coalition government that came to power in May 2010 fully bought into the statements of Ofgem 
and the Labour government Energy Minister 
The significance of this was that the UK, the first European country to restructure its electricity 
system on competitive lines, became the first to state explicitly that the market system would 
not allow climate change objectives to be met. In this paper, we review the proposals and 
identify what their long-term impact, if fully implemented would be. 
5.1 Previous UK policy on low-carbon 
In other countries, measures to promote ‘low-carbon’ were marginal and were intended not to 
change the overall structure. The primary tool adopted has been Feed in Tariffs (FiTs). Of 
course, in the long term, as low-carbon sources take up an increasing proportion of the market, 
unless low-carbon sources are competitive with fossil fuel sources, the market will wither away. 
The European Commission, in its new guidelines on state aid for energy imposed from July 1 is 
requiring that FiTs be phased out from 2016 and be replaced by ‘market-related’ terms and 
beyond 2020, renewable sources should be ‘grid competitive’. However, none of the member 
states had responded to this requirement by July 2014. 
Other EU countries have consistently followed a single policy, usually FiTs, to promote low-
carbon sources. However, by 2010, the UK had used three entirely separate schemes to promote 
renewables. These are discussed in more detail elsewhere. From 1990-98, there had been 
capacity auctions funded by the Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL), under which the government would 
open a call for tenders for a specified amount of capacity and accept the lowest bids. This 
scheme was successful at reducing prices but a high proportion of the successful bids were not 
built because of problems of planning consent and finance. This was replaced in 2002 by a 
Renewable Obligation (RO) under which electricity retailers were required to source an 
increasing percentage, specified by the government, of their supplies from renewables. This will 
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be phased out by 2017. It was not successful, mainly because the penalties for not meeting the 
targets were not sufficient to force the retailers to comply. 
FiTs were introduced in the UK in 2010, but unlike countries like Germany where they have 
been the main instrument to introduce renewables, in UK, they were just targeted at small 
sources, less than 50kW. The uptake of solar panels was rapid and in 2011, the government 
halved the ‘export’ tariff for power sold back to the grid because the budget had been spent. 
Whilst this did not affect those whose installation had already been approved, it did 
dramatically reduce the uptake and the industry that had been built up to supply and fit solar 
panels was badly affected.52 It is not clear what the long-term future for FiTs is given the 
changes to State Aid guidelines. 
5.2 Provisions of the Energy Act of 2013 
There were six main provisions under the Energy Act:53 
1. Introduction of long-term contracts (Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for Difference) to 
provide stable financial incentives to invest in all forms of low-carbon electricity 
generation 
2. A capacity market 
3. A Carbon Price Floor (announced in the 2011 Budget) to reduce investor uncertainty, 
putting a fair price on carbon and providing a stronger incentive to invest in low carbon 
generation now 
4. Liquidity measures to enable the Government to take action to improve the liquidity of 
the electricity market 
5. Emissions Performance Standard (EPS): to limit carbon dioxide emissions from new 
fossil fuel power stations. This effectively prevents new coal-fired plant being built 
unless it has Carbon Capture and Storage fitted 
6. A limit on the number of energy tariffs offered to domestic consumers; a requirement 
for companies to automatically move customers from poor value closed tariffs to 
cheaper deals; a require to provide information by suppliers to consumers on the best 
alternative deals available to them 
Under the first point, in effect, this new law will produce a Single Buyer (SB) body, in July 2014 
yet to be named (referred to as the counterparty body) or established, which will be 
government owned and will contract for power from new low-carbon generation sources. The 
budget for the counterparty body would come from a levy on consumers and would increase to 
£7.6bn on so-called contracts for differences (CfDs)54 by 2020 meaning that it would have about 
£1-1.5bn per year to spend on new projects.55 The CfDs would be long-term contracts to provide 
stable and predictable incentives for companies to invest in low-carbon generation. Under 
these, generators would receive the market price from the market for all kWh generated: if the 
market price is below the contract price, the buyer makes up the difference and vice versa.  
While the counterparty body has been overtly set up for low carbon plants, the higher the 
proportion of plants covered by these contracts, which are entirely outside the market, the more 
risky it will be to build a plant to survive in the market. In a windy, sunny year, the amount of 
solar and wind power produced will be high and given that all the output of such plants has to 
be bought, the utilisation and hence the profitability of gas-fired plants, which will be needed for 
some time to provide flexible capacity, will be low. Logically, this means all plants will 
eventually be covered by long-term contracts written by the government. This will mean that 
the wholesale market will inevitably wither away and given that the wholesale price will be set 
by these government contracts and will be the same for all retailers, there will be nothing for 
the retail companies to compete over. 
Provision for capacity payments was also included in the Energy Act. There have been 
increasing concerns that when Britain’s remaining coal-fired capacity was forced to close in 
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2015/16 under the European Union’s Large Combustion Plant Directive, there would be a 
shortage of generating capacity. Given that in UK in 2013, there was 5GW of modern gas-fired 
plant moth-balled and about 10GW of plant under construction, the issue does not appear a lack 
of investment. The problem appears to be the lack of incentive for generators to retain plant as 
available if it is not profitable even if it is necessary for security of supply. 
In March 2014, the government announced details of the first capacity auction, which took place 
in December 2014. These will provide payments for 15 years agreed four years before the 
payments would start for new capacity and for up to 4 years for existing capacity.56 Payments 
would be capped at £75/kW per year so that a 1000MW plant could get income of up to £75m 
per year. In return, capacity would have to be available to generate when needed or face 
penalties. 
Under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), Carbon trade started in 2005 with the 
market price settling at about €15/tonne. By 2014, the Carbon price had fallen to about 
€4/tonne. However, permits were given to existing generators and gave large profits to them. 
By 2011, the UK government had lost confidence in the EUETS to set a realistic price for Carbon 
– if the market was working well, the Carbon price would be high enough to bridge the gap 
between the cost of fossil-fuel generation and that of low-carbon sources. 
In 2011, the UK government announced Carbon Floor Price (CFP) would come into effect on 
April 1 2013 at about £16/tonne (€19) and would rise in real terms to about £36 (€43) by 2020 
and about £70 (€84) by 2030. Under this scheme, low carbon generators would sell permits and 
if the price was lower than the floor price, the difference will be made up by the ‘Climate Change 
Levy’, which is paid by fossil fuel generators and ultimately consumers. However, pressure on 
the government to act on electricity prices led to the abandonment of the increase in Carbon 
price in 2014 and it will be capped at £18/tonne, around the level set for 2015/16 
Under the liquidity measures, there will be a requirement to force companies to buy a given 
proportion of power through wholesale market under the ‘Secure & promote’ programme 
introduced on April 1 2014. This will require the six major electricity companies (the Big 6) to 
post bid and offer prices for range of contracts up to 2 years ahead during 2 1-hour trading 
windows each day. 
The UK public has become increasingly dissatisfied with the dominance of the Big 6 companies, 
which dominate both generation and retail, are perceived as acting in an exploitative way and a 
public opinion poll found the Big 6 were less trusted than British banks. In July 2014, Ofgem 
referred the electricity market to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK anti-
trust body, for a full-scale investigation. This will be a major inquiry which will not report 
before December 2015 and will have scope to recommend far-reaching changes, for example, 
the break-up of the Big 6 and a requirement for the retail and generation sectors to be separate 
at a corporate level.57 Because of this uncertainty, the companies are unlikely to want to make 
significant commitments when the result of the CMA inquiry could be a significant reduction in 
the UK business. 
5.3 Motivations for EMR 
Given the history since 1990 of governments designing measures to support the nuclear 
industry, e.g., the FFL and the rescue of British Energy from bankruptcy, the question must be 
asked, how far are the EMR proposals designed to facilitate nuclear construction with any 
promotion of renewables a secondary objective? 
In 2006, when the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced his intention to re-start 
nuclear ordering in the UK, a key element that made the policy more publicly acceptable was a 
promise that no public subsidies would be given for new nuclear power plants implying that 
any new nuclear power plants would have to compete with fossil fuel plants on an equal basis, 
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perhaps with some support from a positive Carbon price. It is highly unlikely this promise could 
ever have been fulfilled, but, equally, it is clear that the British government was not prepared to 
abandon its nuclear ambitions at almost any cost. The 2008 White Paper58 foresaw construction 
costs of about £2bn per reactor. By 2010, the expected price tag had more than doubled and in 
2013, when the terms of a deal were provisionally agreed, the price had risen to £8bn59. So, by 
2010, it was clear that the ideal of economic nuclear power plants could not be achieved. 
However, with a CfD that guaranteed the price would not be subject to market risk, the project 
might be financeable. In fact, the terms that had to be agreed were remarkably generous to 
nuclear. The power purchase contract was for 35 years at a price of £92.5/MWh more than 
double market prices in 2013 and sovereign loan guarantees covering about 70 per cent of the 
expected cost were offered. These were far more favourable terms than were being offered for 
renewable projects.  The contract would be signed on the public side by the new counterparty 
body. A particular concern is that if, as the government hopes, nuclear plants start to come on 
line at a rate of at least one per year from 2023 onwards, the budget of the counterparty body 
will be spent on the nuclear plants leaving little to finance new renewable plants. 
5.4 Abandonment of green programmes 
The political pressure resulting from a succession of above inflation electricity price increases 
led to the government abandoning a number of green initiatives from autumn 2013 onwards. 
The freezing of the Carbon price floor at a level far below that needed to bridge the gap between 
low-carbon sources and fossil-fuel sources was noted above.  The Energy Companies Obligation 
(ECO) under which the electricity companies were allowed to collect revenue from customers to 
pay for energy efficiency improvements was cut, saving consumers on average £30-35 per 
household.60 In 2014, the British Prime Minister proposed to not allow construction of new on-
shore wind-farms other than those already permitted.61 The government also announced that 
solar farms would not be allowed.62 
5.5 Conclusion 
Successive attempts to promote renewables in the UK have been significantly less successful 
than planned, in contrast to most other countries where FiTs have frequently led to much 
greater levels of new capacity than expected. In some respects, EMR appears to reflect a 
pragmatic judgement that markets alone will not deliver the low-carbon generation needed to 
allow UK to meet its emissions targets.  
A particular concern is the number of untested mechanisms being introduced at the same time. 
These include: the Single Buyer and CfD system, the capacity payments scheme and the Carbon 
Floor Price compounded by the uncertainty introduced by the CMA Investigation. 
6. Conclusion  
It can be concluded from the evidence presented in this report that EU targets when combined 
with strong, consistent, and comprehensive national renewable energy policies, yield successful 
and promising results. For example, in 2014 in Denmark wind accounted for 28% of the gross 
electricity production63, in Germany in 2014 non-hydro (hydro stands at 4%) RES-E's 
contribution to gross energy supply was 27% (wind 10%, solar 7%, and biomass 10%)64, and in 
2013 Spain generated 21.1% of its electricity from wind.65There are disagreements as to the 
best subsidy methods for development of RES-E. In 2011 in the EU there were two main 
options: (1) Indirect methods, i.e. implicit payments or discounts as well as institutional support 
tools, and (2) direct methods, i.e. investment supports, such as capital grants, tax exemptions or 
reductions on the purchase of goods and operating support mechanisms.  
Since the mandatory national targets were introduced, most countries in the EU including those 
with strongest RES support and implementation record, have introduced policies of austerity to 
battle the effects of the 2007/8 Credit Crunch and the ensuing recession. That meant cuts to 
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public expenditure including RES support. So, we can be talking about a 4th phase of RES policy 
approach in the EU. This phase is based on marketization of RES-E sector and liberalisation of 
energy prices where they earlier were regulated. Such changes in national RES policies will 
make it hard to achieve the 2020 targets even for the champions of the sector in the EU.  
Support mechanisms for RES are colliding with existing economic and industrial policies much 
more frequently; this clash often reflects political sensitivity to voters’ perceptions and 
stakeholders’ interests. More tangible concerns include the potential for RES to displace older 
and more polluting technologies, the impact costlier RES can have on energy prices, and the 
effects that the variable availability of renewable sources has on the delivery of electricity 
(Batlle et al 2011 p. 1) 
In Spain, for example, the lack of policy certainty destabilises functioning and investment in the 
wind industry that is already visible in the lack of orders for wind turbines. This leads to 
changes in the sector and may lead to the relocation of manufacturers to other countries as the 
AEE already has warned (Williamson 2012). By now, with LSE, Royal Decree-Law 9/2013, Law 
24/2013 and Royal Decree 413/2014 ‘the regime will result in many renewable generators 
being unable to fulfil their payment obligations to funders, suppliers, service providers and tax 
authorities, with the end result that some generators may have to file for insolvency, in most 
cases culminating in the liquidation of such companies due to their lack of economic viability’ 
(Ashurst 2014). 
Garman and Thernstrom (2013) identify two main challenges that governments face when 
moving towards renewable energy supply. The first is the high costs of both installation and the 
final consumer cost e.g. Germans and Danes pay 300% of equivalent US consumers. And the 
second is the ‘growing dependence on renewable energy is far more serious: the potential loss 
of reliable electrical supply’. This comes from the ongoing issue of inability to store excess 
energy produced and inability to predict/plan production precisely in advance. Currently grid 
operators ‘rely on coal and nuclear plants to meet base-load demand while modifying gas and 
hydroelectric power output to meet shifting demand’ and compensate for fluctuations in RES 
electricity supply. Such problems can be solved by ‘upgrades to electricity transmission and 
distribution and expansions of "dispatchable" generation capabilities, coupled with "demand-
response" and other efficiency measures’ (Ibid). The International Energy Agency estimated 
that for Germany alone, for example, between €47.5 billion ($62.9 billion) and €72.5 billion 
($96 billion) in transmission and distribution over the next 10 years will be needed. There is 
also a problem of distribution (Moss 2012). Erik Kristofferson, from Energinet, Denmark's grid 
system operator, in 2012 stressed the need for ‘huge investments’ as ‘a wide network of cables 
will have to be built, to bring [offshore wind] power to land, and on to the places where 
consumers use it’ (in Moss 2012). 
The ongoing disputes on gas prices and supply between Russia and Ukraine fuelled by the 
separatist campaign in the east of the latter and the challenges it presents for gas supply and 
price for the EU, force many European politicians to take a stronger stance on renewables as 
part of energy independence strategy. For Denmark, increasing energy independence is 
historically a priority. On 27 June 2014 the EU heads of state and government signed a strategic 
agenda that backs efforts ‘to speed the creation of a common energy market, develop 
infrastructure and diversify supply’. Such added pressure to move toward ‘an energy union with 
forward-looking climate policy’ was provoked by ‘a pricing dispute led to the cut-off of Russian 
natural gas supplies to Ukraine, the transit country for around 15 percent of the EU demand for 
the fuel’ (Kolokowska 2014). 
Batlle at al. (2011) stress that ‘comparatively higher cost of RES-E technologies has made it 
virtually impossible for them to grow without regulatory intervention’ (p. 1). There is a lack of 
consensus as to the best type(s) of intervention that would allow RES targets to be met and 
sustained. The cases we present in this report all point to the continuous need for regulatory 
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intervention as well as state and needed EU support for RES. Recent changes towards 
marketization of the sector and deregulation of prices are the opposite of that. There is 
intervention but it is assuming market forms which will make RES-E targets more difficult to 
achieve. It can thus be concluded that for EU to stay committed to its targets and to support its 
member states on the path to meet the set targets, the liberalised market approach must be 
reviewed and state support for RES energy is essential.   
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